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Abstract: The dramatic growth in sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) has implications which are still 
emerging for national economies and globally. This paper considers why SWFs have become key 
international financial institutions for some countries, particularly developing ones. This adds to 
the literature on second best development strategies (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003), here applying 
it  to  SWFs.  A  macroeconomic  approach  is  taken  towards  the  phenomenon  of  reserves 
accumulation  and  motives  for  SWFs.  These  are  evaluated  in  terms  of  balance  of  payments 
positions  and  inferred  trade  and  exchange  policies.    The  role  of  SWFs  in  promoting  country 
growth and international stability is considered in view of the global financial crisis (GFC).  
 
1.  Introduction 
The rise of the Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) is an intriguing phenomenon which 
raises many issues, not least that of definition. SWFs are identified as government owned 
investment funds based upon central bank accumulation of reserves. They are generally 
administered  from  within  the  government  or  public  sphere,  yet  operate  as  private 
investment funds. They have been mostly characterised by a lack of transparency. The 
global significance of SWFs is reflected in an estimated growth in total value from at 
most US$500 billion in 1990 to US$5 trillion by 2008, equivalent to  more than one 
quarter of US GDP (Johnson, IMF 2007, UNCTAD 2008 pp.20-21). By 2008 SWFs were 
held  by  more  than  forty  countries  including  twelve  large  new  ones  since  2000 
(Commonwealth Secretariat [CS] 2008). The share of oil and gas  related sources for 
SWFs has been estimated at 62% (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute [SWFI] 2008). While 
their value was estimated at a single figure percentage of total global traded securities in 
2007, it approached the value of traded securities for Africa, the Middle East and eastern 
Europe together, or for Latin America (Johnson, IMF 2007).  
SWFs have increasingly effected a public role in private investment markets, and vice 
versa. This encroachment is complex and merits attention. For instance private hedge 
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funds were estimated at a value of around US$2 trillion in September 2007 (Johnson, 
IMF 2007), and SWFs operated in these markets on a small but significant scale. While 
generally keeping conservative portfolios, some SWFs have been more highly geared and 
experienced rogue trading (Johnson 2007). How much the valuation of SWFs‟ assets 
depends on international financial market movements and concomitant risks has been 
tested in the GFC. The relatively cautious approach of most SWFs is reflected in their 
relatively small reductions in value in the GFC. There has also been the recognition that 
their  activities  are  giving  rise  to  new  risk  and  regulatory  issues  for  governments 
generally,  including  regarding  portfolio  structure,  institutional  structure,  governance, 
transparency  and  accountability  (IMF  2008).  In  broader  terms,  the  implications  for 
government monetary and fiscal policy in both short and long term call for assessment. 
The GFC has highlighted the need to evaluate the role of sovereign wealth funds.  
The literature on SWFs has focussed on the motivations of governments in managing 
SWFs, specifically with reference to how this mediates SWF composition and allocation 
in the developed world, particularly the US. Related to this is attention in the literature to 
the regulation of SWFs at the international level and if and how it should differ from that 
applying to private financial institutions (CS 2008, IMF 2008). By contrast, the focus in 
this paper is macroeconomic. That is, it seeks to review rather the institutional function of 
SWFs in relation to macroeconomic and development policy, both at the national and 
international levels. 
The raison d‟être for SWFs is puzzling. If the international financial framework were 
functioning so as to achieve first best objectives, monetary and trade adjustments should 
obviate such institutions. That is, exchange rates, and international trade and monetary 
flows would adjust toward an optimal allocation of resources across and within countries 
in the long run. This would eliminate the sustained surpluses and leave no incentive for 
countries to maintain SWFs. Accordingly this paper investigates the rise in numbers and 
volume of SWFs. It considers the reasons for SWFs within a macroeconomic framework. 
In the literature on SWFs which has developed only recently, the macroeconomics of 
SWFs has been under analysed. This latest version of privatisation has wide but largely 
unforeseen implications for macroeconomic outcomes. More attention has been devoted 
to the financial consequences for commercial portfolio holders and for developed country 3 
 
recipients. The costs and benefits of SWFs to their holders also call for examination. 
More specifically the international and national policy implications for those economies 
are crucial. This paper seeks to investigate those. 
 
Many SWFs are based on the build up of foreign reserves from resource (or other) 
exports, as both volumes and prices have increased. This has  given rise to persistent 
current account surpluses usually, budget surpluses, or other sources of excess domestic 
savings.  The  economies  of  countries  holding  SWFs  are  characterised  by  persistent 
imbalances in current account of balance of payments, and /or fiscal, which movements 
or adjustments in exchange rate and/or resource prices and/or (macro) economy have not 
eliminated. They often exhibit „twin surpluses‟ i.e. current account surplus, and budget 
surplus and / or capital inflow. They manifest the Lucas paradox (1990), in which capital 
flows “up hill” not “down hill” i.e. from countries with less capital to countries with more 
capital. However  SWFs offer a different explanation of this  paradox, akin  to  that of 
Rodrik (2006).  Accordingly the asset structures  of SWFs  insofar  as  they  are  known, 
correspond  to  US  current  account  deficits,  budget  deficits  and  net  capital  outflows 
(domestic and foreign debt). 
Section  2  describes  the  SWF.  Section  3  sets  out  the  value  of  SWFs.  Section  4 
examines the structure and activities of SWFs. Section 5 considers the conditions and 
motives for building up reserves. Section 6 considers the motives for holding SWFs. 
Section 7 examines the pattern of international flows and how they inform the motives 
for SWFs and their operation, and section 8 provides the conclusion.  
 
2.  What is a Sovereign Wealth Fund? 
The institutions which are designated as SWFs take a wide variety of forms. While there 
is a general consensus in the literature as which countries hold SWFs, a proper definition 
remains elusive. SWFs are generally identified as the funds arising from central bank 
reserve accumulation which are set aside for investment. They arise from accumulating 
budget  (eg  Australia)  and  trade  (eg  China)  surpluses,  the  latter  including  foreign 
exchange  from  resource  exports  (eg  Kuwait).  They  are  administered  within  the 
government sphere, and in some cases may be run privately. They can be structured in 4 
 
various ways, often as a legal entity separate from the state or central bank under specific 
legislation or corporate law, or as pooled assets controlled by the Ministry of Finance and 
operated by the central bank or statutory management authority (IMF, IWG 2008, p5). 
They are composed of financial assets such as stocks, bonds, real estate, or other financial 
instruments funded by foreign exchange assets (SWFI 2009). SWFs operate with varying 
degrees  of  transparency  and  accountability  which  makes  identifying  them  and  their 
portfolio composition and returns often difficult. They may have a variety of objectives, 
including maximizing returns, increasing asset base (savings), stabilization (price and/or 
macro),  kinds  of  insurance,  and  pension  fund.  Accordingly  the  associated  degree  of 
liquidity and commerciality varies. “The definition of sovereign wealth fund exclude[s], 
among other things, foreign currency reserve assets held by monetary authorities for the 
traditional balance of payments  or monetary  policy purposes, state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in the traditional sense, government-employee pension funds, or assets managed 
for the benefit of individuals.” (SWFI 2009) 
While SWFs are in some sense distinguished from central bank reserves, in some 
instances they appear to be operated directly from within the central bank. Indeed one of 
the challenges for identification is that SWFs are not always distinguished formally from 
central  bank  operation.  Central  bank  institutions  themselves  are  not  formally  or  well 
specified  in  some  countries.  Central  bank  functions  and  operations  may  operate  in  a 
variety of institutional and regulatory contexts. More broadly the wide variety of ways in 
which SWFs operate across countries reflects the wide range of governmental institutions 
evident. Their operation varies amongst developing countries, for instance China and the 
UAE, but also amongst developed countries, for instance Norway and Japan.  
 
International and regulatory financial environment 
The opportunity offered by SWFs has increased the incentive for governments to 
operate them for greater financial return in the broader manner of a private bank or other 
financial institution, as distinct from the central bank function. The rise of SWFs has 
occurred in the context of the international and domestic financial deregulation of the last 
three decades. The deregulation greatly relaxed domestic and international restrictions on 5 
 
financial operations, so that cross border financial asset accumulation has tripled in the 
last decade (CS 2008). 
 
Sources of SWFs 
The sources of SWF funds can be regarded as twofold, domestic and international. 
Foreign  and  domestic  currency  reserves  have  increased  for  a  number  of  reasons. 
Pressures  on  domestic  policy  towards  budget  surpluses,  privatisation  and  public  debt 
aversion in  the 1990s  have promoted the building of reserves  in  some countries, for 
instance Australia. Above all the distribution of foreign reserves amongst countries has 
increased,  with  some  accumulating  large  reserves  from  exports,  particularly  resource 
exports, above all oil. There has been a widening disparity of current account positions. 
This  is  reflected  in  the  distribution  of  holdings  in  SWFs,  with  „the  top  five  funds 
accounting for about 70 per cent of total assets‟ in 2007 (Johnson, IMF 2007).  
 
The investment strategies of SWFs 
Investment strategies, while often not well known, have reflected SWF objectives. 
Earlier SWF objectives were focussed on wealth preservation. Objectives have included 
stabilisation, infrastructure development, pension and savings funds. Increasingly, they 
are operating as reserve investment corporations (CS 2008).  
The investment motive has arisen in a context of a sharp increase in global liquidity 
and declining yields on financial assets. This has led to diversification of SWF activities 
into a wide variety of financial instruments and portfolio allocations, both public and 
increasingly,  private.  Levels  of  transparency  and  accountability  vary  greatly  but  are 
recognised as poor relative to the standards applied for other public economic activity 
(Truman,  2007).  How  those  levels  compare  with  commercial  standards  is  a  separate 
issue, which rendered more cogent by the advent of the GFC.  
In terms of the types of SWF activity, the IMF has indicated that while SWFs would 
have held  traditionally  „long only‟  assets  such  as  equities and bonds,  they  have  also 
invested in real estate and commodities, and leveraged funds (Johnson, IMF 2007). Their 
investment in hedge funds was reported in mid 2008 as in process of increasing from 1 
per  cent  to  10  per  cent  of  their  portfolios.  The  role  of  SWFs  in  financial  markets 6 
 
including the US dollar, US treasuries and risky assets has been increasing. They have 
been involved in the massive increase in cross border merger and acquisition deals from 
2005 to 2008 (UNCTAD 2008). Half of these deals involved developing country targets 
and  all  involved  a  developing  country‟s  SWF  as  an  acquirer  (CS  2008).  They  have 
enabled one sovereign nation to purchase privatising or private assets in another. 
The first challenge is identifying and measuring the value and direction of flows (IMF, 
International Working Group (IWG) of Sovereign Wealth Funds [IMF] 2008). This is 
discussed in the following section. 
 
3.  The value of SWFs 
The scale of SWFs globally indicates the significance of SWFs as an investment vehicle. 
Issues surrounding the value of SWFs have been pursued in the literature and continue to 
merit  discussion.  The  lack  of  uniformity  in  reporting  presents  a  major  difficulty  in 
measuring the  activities of SWFs.  Their values are reported by secondary sources  at 
various dates.
1 (Peterson Institute 2007, SWFI 2008, CS 2008) For some countries central 
bank reserves  are not reported  separately from investment activities, and some funds 
include reserves of domestic currency, operate as pension funds etc. A key issue is the 
valuation of assets denominated in different currencies , where exchange rates used are 
sensitive to composition and date. The change in valuation since the GFC remains moot. 
Table 1 shows the countries and known larger SWFs ordered by size, the start dates 
and estimates of values up to 2008 for each country. The table also presents measures of 
the  foreign  reserves  for  each  country.  The  countries  with  smallest  SWFs,  and  those 
unknown, planned or presumed are given Appendix A Table 1. There appears to be wide 
variation between SWF values and the country‟s foreign reserves. The allocation between 
sovereign wealth funds and central bank reserves is often not clear; there may be overlap 
or the sovereign wealth funds may be included in  the reserves.  Another issue  in  the 
values is the breakdown or recording of US dollars and other currencies, such that the 
currency composition of the reserves requires further investigation from IMF and other 
sources. To the extent that currencies other than US dollars are included in the figures, 
they are subject to conversion rates. 
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Table 1. Countries with larger Sovereign Wealth Funds, start date, estimated value 
and country’s foreign reserves, to August 2008 
Country  Sovereign Wealth Fund name  Start 
date 






UAE  Abu Dhabi Investment Authority ADIA  1976    875   
 
Abu Dhabi Investment Council/Corp 
ADIC  1977    na   
  Mubadala Development co (Abu Dhabi)  2002    10   
  Emirates Investment Authority (federal)  2007    na   
  Investment Corporation of Dubai  2006    45   
 
RAK investment Authority (Ras Al 
Khaimah)  2004    1.2   
  Est total value    oil  920  77.2 
China 
State Administration of Foreign 
Exchange      311.6   
  Africa Development Fund  2007    5   
 
China foreign investment corporation 
(CIC)  2007    200   
  China national social security fund  2000    74   
  Central Huijin Investment Company   2003    68   
 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
Investment Portfolio  1998    173  160.7 
  Est total value    other  830  1840 
Singapore 
Govt of Singapore Investment 
Corporation  1981    330   
  Temasek Holdings  1974    134   
  Est total value    other  464  177.63 
Norway  Global Pension Fund (GPF)  1976  oil  400  55.61 
Saudi 
Arabia  Saudi Monetary Agency (SAMA)   na    365.2   
  Public Investment Fund  1971    5.3   
  Est total value    oil  370  34 
Kuwait  Kuwait Investment Authority KIA  1953  oil  270  19.63 
Russia  National Welfare Fund  2008  other  162.5  533.9 
Qatar  Qatar Investment Authority  2003  LNG  60  8.37 
US  Alaska Permanent Reserve Fund  1976  oil  39.8   
  Alabama Trust Fund         
 
New Mexico State Investment Office 
Trust  1958    16   
 
Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust 
Fund         
  Est total value      60  69.67 
Australia  Australian Future Fund  2004  other  58.5  33.39 
Libya 
Libyan Investment Authority (previous 
Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Co  2006  oil  50  65.51 8 
 
1981) 
  Est total value         
Algeria  Revenue Regulation Fund  2000  oil  47  126.91 
Ireland  National Pensions Reserve Fund  2001  other  30.8  0.842 
Brunei 
Brunei Investment Authority General 
Reserve Fund  1983  oil  30  ? 
Korea 
South 
Korea Investment Authority / 
Corporation  2005  other  30  264.3 
Malaysia  Khazanah Nasional  1993  other  25.7  122 
Kazakhstan  Kazakhstan National Fund  2000  oil  21.5  19.25 
Canada  Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund  1976  other  16.6  43.06 
Venezuela 
FIEM Macroeconomic Stabilisation Fund) 
National Development Fund 
 
1998 
2005  gas  16 
 
32.72 
Chile  Pension Reserve  1985  oil     
  Social and Economic Stabilisation Fund  2006  oil     
  Est total value    other  16  22.24 
Taiwan  National Stabilisation Fund  2000  other  15  286.86 
New 
Zealand  NZ Superannuation Fund  2001  other  13.8  15.57 
Iran  Oil Stabilisation Fund  1999  oil  12.9  70 
Nigeria  Excess Crude Account  2004  oil  11  59.7 
Azerbaijan  State oil fund  1999  oil  10.2  4 
Bahrain  Mumtalakat Holding Co  2006  oil  14  3.47 
Botswana  Pula Fund  1997  other  6  10.02 
Timor-
Leste  Petroleum Fund  2005  oil  3   
Oman  State General Reserve Fund  1980  oil  2  7.00 
Sao  Tome 
and 
Principe  National Oil Account  2004  oil  1  0.03 
Sudan  Oil Revenue Stabilisation Account  2002  oil  1  1.25 
Kiribati  Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund  1956  other  1   
Mauritania 
National Fund for Hydrocarbon 
Reserves  2006  oil  0.3   
Sources: OECD International investment of SWFs, note by Commonwealth Secretariat, 21, 16 Nov 2007, swfinst, Truman, Peterson 
Inst, Financial Times 
 
Forty-two countries are identified as having or being planned or presumed to have SWFs, 
but there are undoubtedly more, notably Japan. Chart 1 shows countries with known 
SWFs  ranked  by  value  (omitting  the  very  smallest),  the  largest  being  UAE  with  an 
estimated value of up to US $875 billion.  9 
 
Chart 1: Estimated value of sovereign wealth funds by country, various dates 
 
Sources: OECD , Commonwealth Secretariat 2007, swfinst, Truman, Peterson Inst, Financial Times 
 
The importance of the SWF to the country‟s economy is shown in Chart 2 which presents 
the value of the SWF as a percentage of the country‟s GDP, ranked by value of SWF. Not 
surprisingly the largest SWFs are also a large proportion of the economy.  Only in the 
very big  economies of  China, Russia and the  USA do high value SWFs  represent  a 
smaller percentage of the economy.  SWFs represent a high share of the economies of oil 
producers, in particular Brunei. 
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Chart 2: SWF as a percentage of GDP, by size of SWF  
 
Sources: OECD 2007, note by Commonwealth Secretariat, 21, 16 Nov 2007, swfinst, Truman, Peterson Inst, Financial Times 
 
SWFs are widely associated with foreign reserve accumulation. Chart 3 compares the 
values of countries‟ total SWFs with their foreign currency reserves (IMF IFS), omitting 
the countries with the smallest values of both, but including countries with planned or 
presumed  but  unknown  SWFs  on  the  right.  While  recognising  that  there  is  possible 
double  counting  between  central  bank  /  finance  ministry  foreign  reserves  and  SWFs 
(Truman 2007), the view has been expressed that SWFs are on the whole additional to 
foreign  exchange  reserves  (Griffith-Jones  and  Ocampo  2008  [GJO]  p.  7).  Forensic 
investigation  of  the  accounts  would  be  required  in  order  to  reliably  analyse  the 
relationship between values of actual foreign reserves and SWFs. Otherwise the split or 
overlap between SWFs and foreign reserves is mostly unknown. It is clear that these 
countries are holding substantial SWFs and reserves regardless. The reserve holdings 
appear to exceed any central bank reserve requirement. 
 
Insofar  as  the  measures  can  be  accepted,  there  is  little  systematic  relationship 
demonstrated between SWF and reserve size. It is striking that only for the Gulf States 11 
 
and the established Norway fund, do  SWFs  apparently exceed  foreign reserves. This 
indicates  that  countries  have  variety  of  strategies  for  allocating  surplus  reserves  and 
motives  for  holding  sovereign  wealth  funds.    This  paper  seeks  to  investigate  these 
strategies and motives.   
 
Chart 3: Estimated value of sovereign wealth funds and foreign reserves by country, 
to August 2008 
 
Sources: OECD 2008, Commonwealth Secretariat 2007, swfinst, Truman, Peterson Inst, Financial Times 
 
For instance countries with older SWFs might be expected to have a larger size SWF 
relative to reserves. Table 2 categorizes SWFs ranked according to their value relative to 
the country‟s reserves,  and includes the age of the country‟s oldest known SWF. As 
expected SWFs tend to exceed foreign reserves in the countries with the oldest SWFs, 
including the  big Middle Eastern oil producers UAE, Saudi Arabia  and Kuwait,  and 
Singapore and Norway. However some more recent SWFs exceed reserves too, and some 
older ones do not, for instance Libya and Oman. Without confidence in the measurement 
this may be an artifact. Clearly the advantages to a country of a SWF relative to holding 
reserves call for further investigation. They may be shown in the fund structure of the 
SWFs. 12 
 
Table 2: SWFs and foreign currency reserves by country, and date of oldest known 
SWF 
  SWF > foreign reserves  SWF < foreign reserves 
Developing countries  UAE, 1976 
Singapore, 1974 



















Sao Tome and Principe, 2004 





New Zealand, 2001 
Sources: OECD International investment of SWFs, note by Commonwealth Secretariat, 21, 16 Nov 2007, swfinst, Truman, Peterson 
Inst, Financial Times 
 
4.  The structure and activities of SWFs 
It  is  tricky  to  discover  portfolios  of  most  SWFs.  They  may  be  inferred  from 
compiling  financial  press  reports  about  individual  transactions  from  the  other  parties 
involved,  and  from  IMF  and  UNCTAD.  Most  SWFs  do  not  report  their  investment 
profile, but it tends to be long term low risk. Portfolio includes equity (less than 10% of 
the firm‟s worth), FDI (more than 10 per cent, and includes M&A) and fixed income 
instruments, or low risk, e.g. US Treasury bonds. SWFs invest heavily in low-yield US 
government  bonds  and  their  acquisitions  of  stocks  and  higher  yield  assets  while 
increasing  are  „normally  less  than  10  per  cent‟  (UNCTAD  2008  p.21).  The  major 
transactions just prior to the GFC offer an impression of activities. 
 
Table 3: SWFs' major cross-border equity investments and FDI, 15 months 2007-Q1 2008 
Sovereign wealth fund   Acquired company   US$ billion  % of firm value 
GIC of Singapore  UBS   9.8  8.6 
undisclosed “Middle East investor”  UBS   1.8  1.6 
Abu Dhabi Investment Council    Citigroup   7.6  4.9 
GIC of Singapore    Citigroup   6.9  4.4 
Investment Corporation of Dubai    MGM Mirage   5.1  9.5 
China Investment Company    Morgan Stanley   5  9.9 
Temasek (Singapore)    Merrill Lynch  5  11.3 
KIA (Kuwait)   Merrill Lynch  3.4  7 
KIC (Korea)   Merrill Lynch   2  4.3 13 
 
GIC of Singapore   Merrill Lynch  1  100 
Qatar Investment Authority    Sainsbury   3.7  25 
China Development Bank   barclays  3  3.1 
Temasek (Singapore)  barclays  2  1.8 
China Investment Company  Blackstone   3  10 
Investment Corporation of Dubai    London Stock Exchange   3  28 
Qatar Investment Authority   London Stock Exchange   2  20 
Temasek (Singapore)   China Eastern Air   2.8  8.3 
SAFE (China)   Total   2.8  1.6 
SAFE (China)    British Petroleum   2  1 
Temasek (Singapore)   Standard Chartered   2  5.4 
Investment Corporation of Dubai    Standard Chartered   1  2.7 
Abu Dhabi Investment Council   Carlyle Group  1.4  7.5 
Investment Corporation of Dubai   Och-Ziff   1.3  9.9 
Investment Corporation of Dubai    Mauser Group   1.2  100 
Investment Corporation of Dubai  Alliance Medical  1.2  100 
GIC of Singapore   Myer Melbourne   1  100 
China Citic Securities    Bear Stearns   1  6 
Borse Dubai  Nasdaq   1  19.9 
Investment Corporation of Dubai    Almatis   1  100 
Investment Corporation of Dubai   Barney's New York   0.9  100 
Investment Corporation of Dubai    EADS  0.8  3.1 
GIC of Singapore   Hawks Town   0.8  100 
Investment Corporation of Dubai    ICICI Bank Ltd   0.8  2.9 
Temasek (Singapore)    Westin   0.7  100 
Mubadala Development Co (UAE)    Advanced Micro Devices  0.6  8 
GIC of Singapore   WestQuay Shopping Centre  0.6  50 
GIC of Singapore  Roma Est Shopping Centre   0.1  50 
Investment Corporation of Dubai    Sony   0.5  1 
Qatar Investment Authority   OMX   0.5  10 
GIC of Singapore    British Land  0.3  3 
Investment Corporation of Dubai    Metropole Hotel  0.3  100 
GIC of Singapore    Kungshuset  0.2  100 
SAFE (China)   Commonwealth Bank of Australia  0.2  0.3 
SAFE (China)  Australia and N Z Banking Group  0.2  0.3 
SAFE (China)    National Australia Bank   0.2  0.3 
Temasek (Singapore)    9You Online Games   0.1  9.4 
Total     91.5   
Source:  derived from financial press, media, CS, Beck and Fidora 2008 (ECB)   
 
Table 3 summarises examples of key transactions over the 15 months from Q1 2007 to 
Q2 2008 inclusive, including those relating to less developed countries, which are even 
less reported than those for the industrial countries. The overall impression is that China 
and Singapore SWFs are outward looking compared with the Gulf SWFs. Each purchase 
of a share of a firm is in temporal order, note that the rate of valuation for a given entity 
falls at each purchase, reflecting the onset of the GFC.  14 
 
The transactions with the banks particularly foreshadow losses experienced by the SWFs 
during the GFC, especially for those located in the east Asian area. The figures reflect the 
extent to which SWFs were involved in bail outs of firms related to the GFC in the 15 
month period 2007 and Q1 2008. Overall US$100 b was known to be spent on equity in 
2007-2008, with at least 60% of that into banks and hedge funds. Nearly one quarter 
(more than US$23 b) was in banks and hedge funds which failed, including Morgan 
Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns etc. For example Kuwait Investment Company was 
reported to have lost US$260 m from such transactions (FT 24 Oct 2008). It should be 
noted that these numbers were a small proportion of SWF totals. 
Prior debate in the literature had tended to be concerned with the extent to which 
SWFs‟  activities  were  potentially  destabilising  to  hosts.  SWFs  had  been  previously 
argued not to impact on global stock market (Beck and Fidora July 2008, Seznec Summer 
2008 etc). Then the focus shifted to the implications of the losses for SWFs‟ activities 
and their overall asset value. The GFC effect on the portfolios of SWFs was apparently 
limited owing to their small commitment. Press reported estimates driven by high oil 
prices  at  September  2008  of  a  write  down  of  25%  in  SWF  assets  were  clearly 
exaggerated. The SWFs have been reported as operating strategically since then, buying 
at  low  market,  with  coordination  amongst  some  of  them.  Their  activity  has  been 
interpreted as returns driven rather than philanthropic as such. This does not preclude the 
question of the extent to which they can be regarded as a kind of international built in 
stabilizer. 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) by SWFs 
FDI, which is treated as the purchase of greater than 10 per cent of entity, includes 
greenfield  investments,  and  mergers  and  acquisitions  (M&A).  The  definition  is 
problematic with increasing globalization, including the phenomenon of „round tripping‟ 
in which companies trade each other‟s shares across borders in order to inflate trading 
volumes.  
In 2007 FDI by SWFs was estimated at US$10 billion, perhaps 0.6 per cent of total 
FDI flows globally, with large transactions by SWFs numbering only in the tens. The 
magnitude  of  SWFs‟  transactions  is  put  in  perspective  when  compared  with  private 15 
 
equity funds whose FDI was worth over $460 billion (85%), out of their total assets of 
around US$540 billion at September 2008. However the assets of private funds are worth 
a mere 10 or 11 per cent of those of SWFs, the latter assets estimated at US$5 trillion 
(UNCTAD 2008). This strongly supports an impression of caution on the part of SWFs. 
They do not appear to have particularly risk loving or short horizon portfolios overall, 
however individual SWFs operate differently from each other.  
The perception of risk aversion is supported by the lack of SWF investment in less 
developed countries, if these are more risky. For instance over the last two decades 0.2 
per cent total of SWFs‟ assets acquired have been in FDI (US$39 b), mostly acquired by 
the UAE (UNCTAD 2008 p.xvi). US$31 billion of that total was committed in the three 
years to 2008. The share of total FDI by SWFs which flowed to developing countries was 
about  27%  or  US$10.5  billion,  and  „very  limited‟  for  Africa  and  Latin  America 
(UNCTAD WIR 2008). 
The number of FDI transactions by SWFs is small but increasing, with cross-border 
M&A outflows by SWFs increasing from one in 1987 to thirty in 2005, averaging about 
US$0.5 billion annually (UNCTAD 2008 p.21), see Chart 4. A 73% share of the total was 
in the services sector, with business services 24% of the total, tourism a significant share 
of the remainder. Of twenty large FDI outflows by SWFs from 1995 to 2007, 12 are from 
UAE and 6 from Singapore, with one from Australia (UNCTAD 2008 p.24). The hosts 
are mostly the US or UK, with one each to Taiwan and Japan. Of the next twentieth to 
fiftieth largest FDI outflows 1987-2007 by SWFs, 17 are by the UAE, 8 by Singapore, 
and most acquired from OECD or richer Asian countries (UNCTAD 2008 p.217). Of less 
developed country hosts, South Korea is the host in three cases, two of which were oil 
related and one in finance. The level or pattern of FDI flows from acquisitions by SWFs 
do not offer strong support so far for a strategic role in development for the poorer less 
developed countries.  16 
 
Chart 4: Example: FDI by SWFs, UNCTAD 
2008
 
Source: reproduced from UNCTAD/PRESS/PR/2008/037/Rev.1, 24/09/08 
 
Having considered data on the magnitude, structure and recent growth of SWFs, the 
paper now turns to the reasons for the rise of SWFs as a government vehicle for private 
investment.  It contributes to a growing literature addressing this question. Two separate 
issues arise here. One is to consider the conditions which give rise to the accumulation of 
reserve surpluses which are the source of SWFs. The other issue is the relation between 
the macroeconomic conditions in those countries holding SWFs, and how they reflect 
motives for holding SWFS.  
 
5.  Conditions and motives for building up reserves 
The  increase  in  number  and  size  of  SWFs  reflects  a  massive  increase  in  foreign 
reserve assets in developing countries in recent decades (Chart 3). In this section we turn 
to consider the circumstances for the build up. These include running persistent balance 17 
 
of  payments  surpluses  by  mostly  resource  exporters  who  have  faced  consistently 
increasing resource prices over more than a decade, mostly in US dollars, with stable 
exchange rates. Foreign reserves may be accumulated for other reasons, and sometimes 
SWFs are funded by borrowing (intermediation). 
Of the global increase in foreign exchange reserves from US$2.1 trillion at end 2001 
to US$6.2 trillion at October 2007, over 80% was in less developed countries which held 
reserves of around US$5 trillion by then (IMF, GJO pp.2-3, Rodrik 2006). However these 
increases were accumulated by particular countries. Three quarters of the Asian increase 
of US$1.6 trillion from 2003 to 2007 was in China and India. China, India and the oil 
exporting countries accounted for over half the increase in global reserves in that period 
(GJO p.3).  
While these reserves  increases  are accounted for in  large part by  current  account 
surpluses over time, „in several cases the accumulation of official external assets, several 
of which are SWFs, tends to underestimate the importance of capital inflows as a source 
of reserve accumulation, as the accumulation of such official assets is accounted for as a 
negative contribution to the capital account‟ (GJO p.4). That is for some countries which 
show  negative  capital  account  balances  due  to  capital  inflows,  these  also  reflect  the 
foreign asset accumulation activities of SWFs and corresponding returns. Of the three 
regions of developing Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, only the latter has a 
negative capital account balance, corresponding to a net capital inflow and the build up of 
foreign assets in SWFs in the region. Some individual countries in the other regions also 
show a negative capital account balance: Singapore, Venezuela and less so, Chile.  
Moreover where SWFs have traditionally been „run autonomously from traditional 
reserve management by central banks and / or finance ministries‟, the US$6.2 trillion 
increase in 2001-2007 „underestimates the actual increase of foreign exchange assets‟, 
particularly if as above SWFs are additional to foreign reserves (GJO pp.6-7). It would 
appear  that  SWFs  grew  among  other  things  as  a  strategy  for  using  current  gains  to 
smooth consumption and preserve the wealth of future generations. Two more purposes 
include a financing fund which absorbs a budget surplus or funds a deficit, and to finance 
infrastructure (GJO p.9). Accordingly the motives for SWFs merit closer scrutiny. 
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6.  Motives for holding SWFs 
These have been characterised as self insurance, wealth substitution, resilient surplus 
and countercyclical (esp. Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 2008 [GJO], Aizenman and Glick 
2007, Rodrik 2008a).  The challenge is to distinguish the motives  for holding SWFs 
specific to individual countries from examining macroeconomic behaviour. In one view 
the  rationale  for  the  accumulation  of  foreign  exchange  reserves  is  seen  in  terms  of 
competitive  /  mercantilist  motives  for  growth,  or  self  insurance.  In  the  mercantilist 
rationale, countries seek export competitiveness in export-led growth, through stable and 
weak exchange rates, the benefits of which exceed the costs of reserve accumulation. At 
the same time a self insurance approach allows the US to rely on domestic demand to 
drive its economic growth (GJO p.10). This applies when the source of foreign exchange 
abundance is the capital account rather than the current account. The host economy for 
the capital inflow is subject to highly pro-cyclical movements with the risk of capital 
flow reversibility. The motive for self insurance should be higher where a larger share of 
more  volatile  capital  funds  and  more  open  capital  account  pertains  (GJO  p.22).  The 
exchange rate interventions that are needed to keep exchange rates low could be argued 




In the self insurance view, for instance the Asian nations reacted to the Asian crisis 
by accumulating foreign reserves in order to avert financial integration and instability and 
avoid  IMF  programs  with  their  conditionality  (GJO  p.11,  Rodrik  2008a).  Moreover 
instability arises also from the behaviour of domestic agents‟ capital flight during a crisis 
and repatriation during a boom, so that nations seek to keep a proportion of total external 
liabilities as reserves, proportionate to the openness of the capital account and financial 
development (GJO p.12, Obstfeldt et al 2007). It has also been argued that increasing 
reserves is viewed as preferable to capital or other prudential financial controls for a 
variety  of  reasons  including  that  controls  on  short  term  capital  flows  hurt  powerful 
financial interests, that financial integration is perceived as linked to trade integration and 
that the current international financial system makes these difficult to control (Rodrik 19 
 
2006,  GJO  p.13).  It  has  been  argued  that  the  financial  crisis  could  lead  to  global 
regulations which obviate the need to accumulate large foreign exchange reserves. This is 
particularly  apposite  for  large  resource  exporters  who  are  highly  vulnerable  to  the 
consequences of exchange rate instability in a context where studies have found that the 
latter inhibits growth (GJO, Rodrik 2008b).  
 
Wealth substitution 
Another  motivation  for  transforming  foreign  reserves  into  SWF  assets  is  that  of 
wealth substitution where an illiquid non-renewable natural resource may be transformed 
at least partially into more or less liquid foreign exchange assets. (GJO p.17). Whether 
this  results  in  optimal  allocation  is  another  question  (Rodrik  2008a),  as  over 
diversification is apparent in some countries whereby some sectors are overcapitalised, 
for instance the tourist industry which is subject to developed country demand. A related 
question  is  the  potential  for  „Dutch  disease‟  where  resource  revenues  are  used  for 
domestic spending rather than accumulation of foreign assets. The basic argument is that 
exchange rate appreciation increases growth in non-tradeable sectors but contracts the 
tradeable  sectors,  limiting  their  productivity  and  constraining  the  realization  of 
economies of scale (GJO p.18). It is possible that the GFC has limited the costs from 
Dutch disease, to the extent that countries substitute domestic investment for less reliable 
foreign  investment.  The  investment  decision  involves  the  profitability  of  some 
combination of domestic spending and foreign asset accumulation relative to the increase 
in value of the resource from leaving it the ground, in the context of risk.   
 
Resilient surplus 
This is the case where economies tend to run current account surpluses even with 
growth and exchange rate appreciation, the converse of the twin deficits model. This 
arises from overcompetitiveness or excess savings, for example Australia. However there 
may be no „equilibrium‟ exchange rate that eliminates the surplus (GJO p.20), in other 
words the sustained current account surplus is such that the currency would continue to 




This motive relates to cyclical swings in demand for export volumes associated with 
foreign business cycles, or „cyclical swings in external prices, particularly commodity 
prices‟.  Either  can  result  in  real  exchange  rate  appreciation  and  Dutch  disease  type 
effects. These can be smoothed through official intervention in exchange markets and 
accumulation of surplus, or paying foreign debt and encouraging other forms of capital 
outflow  (GJO  pp.20-21).  Stabilization  calls  for  identifying  the  transitory  from  the 
permanent  parts  of  any  shock  to  commodity  prices,  and  taxing  the  commodity 
accordingly. 
Because  both  commodity  prices  and  capital  flows  are  pro-cyclical,  the  different 
motives  interact  with  each  other.  A  current  account  surplus  attracts  capital  inflows 
because  of  the  boom  and  the  real  exchange  rate  appreciation  which  makes  domestic 
assets more attractive relative to foreign. However this makes the management of the 
factors  which  underly  the  current  account  surplus  more  difficult  and  compounding 
exuberance  leading  to  further  boom  in  demand,  real  exchange  rate  appreciation  and 
Dutch disease effects, and excessive risk taking promoting financial crises later. Again 
this needs evaluation as to the distribution of such effects as has occurred with the GFC. 
This may be potentially worsened by the instruments used to absorb the resources. GJO 
p.22).  
The motives determine the nature of the fund and the composition of its investments.  
GJO argue that SWFs are preferred instrument when there is a current account surplus 
especially when it is long lasting. That is savings funds are for wealth substitution and 
resilient surplus. However for the self insurance motive, where net capital inflows are the 
source of the funds, what is needed is an international capital intermediary to channel 
capital inflows into lending or investment abroad. A development bank or fund could 
channel  resources  into  neighbouring  countries  including  infrastructure  projects  that 
would encourage trade with them, or into regional development banks (GJO p.23). This is 
the situation in which the EU SWF has been proposed. 
The following section examines the balance of payments scenarios which SWFs are 
operating in order to investigate how they relate to country motives for holding SWFs. 
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7.  The balance of payments and SWFs: 
Use is made of IMF IFS data in order to analyze the international flows position for 
individual countries with SWFs. This  employs  the methodology of GJO which  was 
applied only to some Latin American countries and regional aggregates.  For this paper 
the balance of payments positions for all countries with known SWFs are analysed in 
relation to the motives for holding the SWF. The intention is to obtain a cross section 
snapshot of the macroeconomic conditions of SWF operation. 
 
The macroeconomic identity 
The behavioural relation is drawn from the macroeconomic role of the balance of 
payments (GJO). The identity is: 
ΔR – ΔF = X – M = S – I         (1) 
where ΔR is change in reserves,  
ΔF is net external capital outflows,  
X – M is current account balance and  
S – I is net domestic savings,  
Note that G - T could be added. 
 
Data 
Measures were found for 
(a) Reserves. Net foreign reserves inflows is here measured as a plus, n. b. measured 
as a minus on balance of payments accounts.  This is the sum over five years, 2003-2007. 
(b)  Current account balance, plus sign => more exports than imports of goods and 
services, X – M > 0 
(c) Capital  account  =  old  capital  account  =  IMF  capital  account  balance  +  IMF 
financial account balance, negative sign corresponds to net capital inflow, for balance on 
balance of payments => current account balance > 0. 
(d)  Balancing account items = „overall balance‟ line in  IMF balance of payments 
accounts  
Change in reserves, current account balance, capital account balance and overall balance 
of countries with SWFs, are all from IMF International Financial Statistics country data. 22 
 
Change in reserves is „Total reserves minus gold‟ accumulated 2003 – 2007 (sometimes 
2002-2006 or latest), and the Balances on current and capital accounts and overall are for 
2007, or 2006, or latest reserve data reported. 
Based on the data described above, Chart 5 presents the balance of payments 
positions for all countries with known SWFs, ranked by size of SWF. An impression of 
the global payments position of the countries with SWFs can be gained from it.  The 
USA  stands  out  as  having  the  mirror  image  of  the  payments  positions  of  the  other 
countries.  The USA has a current account deficit and capital inflows which appear to 
approximate  the  sum  of  current  account  surpluses  and  capital  outflows  of  the  other 
countries.  Chart 6 removes the USA data in order to show the payments positions of the 
other countries more clearly. The positions of China and Russia are the outcome of high 
growth  rates  in  the  period  2003-2007,  whereby  current  account  inflows  and  capital 
outflows (measured as positive on the x axis) coincide with reserves growth.  
In order to compare the relative significance of balance of payments positions 
across countries,  Chart  7  builds  on Chart 2 and presents  the payments  data taken as 
percentages of GDP. Unsurprisingly, the countries where current account inflows are a 
high  percentage  of  GDP  (over  50%)  are  also  those  whose  SWFs  are  also  a  high 
proportion, including mostly the major oil producers. For the remainder, most payments 
values shown are less than 50% of GDP. 23 
 
Chart 5: Foreign balances of countries with SWFs, 2007 
 
Source: IMF IFS Sept 2008 
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Chart 6: Foreign balances of countries with SWFs, except USA, 2007 
 




Chart 7: Foreign balances of countries with SWFs, as a percentage of GDP, 2007 
 
Source: IMF IFS Sept 2008 
 
Table 4 categorizes the countries according to balance of payments positions. 
Table 4: Countries with SWFs: current and capital account positions. 
   Current account surplus  Current account deficit 
Capital account 
surplus 
China M, Russia, Korea S  USA, Australia, Ireland, 
Kazakhstan, NZ, Sudan 
Capital account 
deficit 
Singapore, Norway, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, China HK, 
Libya, Brunei, Malaysia, 
Canada, Venezuela, Chile, 
Bahrain, Nigeria, Azerbaijan, 
Botswana, Oman, 
none 
Missing data: UAE, Qatar, Algeria, Iran, Taiwan, Japan 
 
Findings 
The data reveal the following patterns: 26 
 
a)  A pattern of current account surpluses and capital account inflows (shown below x 
axis in the charts):  Mostly resource exporters including 
  Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Bahrain, Oman, and 
  Norway,  Brunei,  Malaysia,  Canada,  Venezuela,  Chile,  Nigeria, 
Azerbaijan, Botswana 
  Asian are entrepô ts (Singapore and HK) or transform resources (Japan). 
Where  the  SWF  is  operated  from  the  central  bank,  the  increase  of  US$6  trillion  in 
reserves from 2003-07 is probably understated in so far as capital inflows occur, as they 
involve purchase of foreign assets, either equity or financial (GJO).  (Note that UAE, 
Qatar, Iran and Algeria do not report capital account balance to the IMF.) The extent to 
which countries with very large SWFs are engaging in self insurance depends on how the 
extent  of  reserve  accumulation  relates  to  their  exchange  rate  regime,  and  this  would 
require investigation. In turn the wealth substitution strategies depend on the nature of the 
capital inflows, that is whether they are spent on infrastructure, the pattern of industry 
investment etc. 
b)  A pattern of current account deficits and capital account outflows (shown above x 
axis):  
  USA, Australia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, NZ and Sudan 
  Australia  and  Ireland  have  negative  reserve  flows  (implies  domestic 
excess  savings),  other  motives  for  SWFs  such  as  managing  domestic 
savings, pension fund 
  Kazakhstan, NZ and Sudan have positive reserve flows.  
The countries in this category appear more diverse in their motives for holding SWFs.  
For instance Australia and Ireland have had excess domestic savings over a period of 
economic growth, displaying resilient surpluses and generating budget surpluses from 
stabilisers  (tax  collection)  and  in  Australia‟s  case,  privatisation  revenue.  Australia‟s 
Future Fund has the explicit task of funding public pensions‟ unfunded liabilities. Some 
countercyclical motives are evident for the richer economies.  
c)  Pattern of current account surpluses and capital account outflows (above x axis): 
  China, Russia and Korea S, with positive foreign reserve flows 27 
 
Foreign borrowing is occurring at the same time as reserve fund accumulation, implying 
that  SWFs  are  a  conduit  for  managing  foreign  borrowing  along  with  other  portfolio 
investment.    These  countries  might  be  seen  to  have  a  self  insurance  strategy  of 
maintaining low exchange rates, domestic diversification and investment abroad. 
 
8.  Conclusion 
The above analysis is preliminary and shows that more comprehensive analysis is 
called for in order to shed light on the enormous growth of SWFs in the last few years, 
considering that the institution has existed for a much longer time. It is no coincidence 
that the rise of SWFs has coincided with an international regulatory framework which has 
offered  countries  apparently  inferior  strategies  for  development  in  terms  of  IMF  and 
World Bank requirements for fiscal and monetary management. These measures are seen 
to remove exchange rates and international flows from sovereign regulation, and leave 
economies open to global instability and absent policies toward growth. More broadly the 
role of government in the economy is left in question, whether in regard to short term 
stabilisation  priorities  or  longer  term  allocation  of  resources.  The  SWFs  are  a 
manifestation of hesitation to use exchange rate adjustments as the strategy for managing 
the economy. They are also a strategy for managing assets when domestic absorption 
cannot  match  the  rate  of  surplus  accumulation.  The  Asian  countries  have  expressly 
indicated their debt aversion since the crisis of the late 1990s, so SWFs  may offer a 
preferred development strategy.  
Further analysis is called for in order to distinguish the various motives for SWFs, 
and the implications for the role of government in the economy. The performance of 
SWFs  in  terms  of  the  implications  of  the  allocation  resources  between  sectoral 
investment and consumption in domestic economies needs to be evaluated. This is in 
terms of current macroeconomic performance. It would seem that the SWFs provide a 
degree of insurance for their countries in relation to the GFC, and this calls for further 
consideration.  It  is  also  needs  to  be  evaluated  as  a  development  strategy  in  terms 
substituting resources toward the future.  28 
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